Ethical Considerations in Technology Transfer by Froehlich, Thomas J.
Ethical Considerations in Technology Transfer 
THOMASJ. FROEHLICH 
ABSTRACT 
ISSUES are examined from the perspectives IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
of Kantianism and utilitarianism and in terms of the factors that 
must be considered in moral deliberation-i.e., social responsibility; 
social utility; and individual, professional, and institutional survival. 
In current practice, utilitarianism operates under the guise of 
technology needs assessment. This article advances the argument that 
ethical deliberation in technology transfer is biased toward the 
utilitarian view, that utilitarianism has inherent difficulties in 
projecting the consequences of technology transfer, that utilitarian 
principles are often sabotaged by political or self-serving goals and 
ideologies, and that the perspectives offered by Kant and feminism 
are important aspects in establishing what should be a dialectical 
process for determining which technologies are appropriate and how 
they should be transferred. 
INTRODUCTION 
Wales seems an unusual place for an American to reflect on ethical 
considerations in technology transfer, particularly the transfer of 
information technology, and the role of information professionals 
in the process. Yet i t  is the experience of teaching several summers 
at the International Graduate Summer School in Aberystwyth that 
evoked these reflections. Students, faculty, and professionals from 
as many as forty different countries gathered for this cross-cultural 
educational experience, now under the auspices of the Department 
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of Library and Information Studies of the University College of Wales. 
(Before its merger with the University College of Wales, the school 
was known as the College of Librarianship Wales. The summer 
program has been renamed the International Graduate Information 
Summer School.) The summer school was designed, in part, precisely 
for the purpose of facilitating transfer of information technologies 
from developed countries to less developed countries (LDCs). 
Information technologies are an integral part of successful technology 
transfer and contribute to an LDC’s ability to develop and sustain 
scientific and technological activities. During these summer 
programs, information professionals from various countries 
discovered many shared needs and concerns, but the diversity of needs, 
the plurality of problems, and cultural differences also became 
apparent. This heterogeneity made the issues of technology transfer 
and ethical considerations all the more difficult. 
Transfer of technology touches on such issues as global 
economics, balance of trade deficits, political and social beliefs, 
balances of power, allocation of world resources, and environmental 
issues. Its rise to prominence as a geopolitical issue stems from 
imbalances between advanced or developed countries and under- 
developed or lesser developed countries. Graham (1982) reports that 
northern or developed countries account for 95 percent of all the 
world’s research and development while southern countries, 
representing 70 percent of the world’s population, generate only 4 
percent (p. 45). Technology transfer is important for economic 
development, but much of the available technology is invested with 
proprietary rights so that i t  cannot be freely transferred. 
APPROACHESTO TECHNOLOGY 
There are many ways in which technology can be understood. 
For this article we will distinguish among three levels of technology: 
( 1) technology in  general; (2) technological practices, and 
(3 )  technological packages. In general, a technology can be 
characterized as a group of techniques, either intellectual or 
embodied, orchestrated as a totality for solving a particular problem 
or set of interrelated problems. The technologies with which 
information professionals are familiar can be divided into two kinds: 
( 1 )  “intellectual technologies” (Taylor, 1986) such as classification, 
cataloging, indexing and abstracting, technologies that perform 
“value-added processes in information systems,” and (2) technologies 
as embodied systems of tools or procedures, such as computer systems 
and their use in online public access catalogs. In practice, this 
distinction is difficult to maintain because intellectual technologies, 
manifest in the mental activities of theoreticians or experienced 
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professionals, lead to forms of embodiment-e.g., theories of 
classification lead to systems such as Dewey Decimal, thesauri, 
authority lists, etc. These embodiments, taken up  by professionals, 
may in turn influence perceptions and intellectual organization. 
The intellectual technologies are like Kan t’s schemas, structures 
by which experience is organized and which make experience possible. 
For example, information professionals acquire classification schemes 
through courses, lectures, exercises, and reading; but once the schemes 
are acquired, they become devices through which classifiers and 
catalogers structure their experience of intellectual works, which 
thereby transform their experience of those works. This may not 
always be appropriate. Berman (1981) noted that the 1979 Dewey 
Decimal Classification had inadequate coverage of popular music 
and gay issues and had ambiguous treatment of North American 
Indians. Classification schemes and subject headings tend to reflect 
the biases of the general population. Since the dominant classification 
and subject heading schemes were developed in America, the bias 
they reflect is an American one. These biases may inhibit the easy 
applications of such classifications to local issues in a developing 
country. 
In addition to characterizing the technology associated with 
information work, one should also distinguish, as Pacey (1983) does, 
between technology and technology practices. Technology practices 
are individual or generic applications of technologies in a specific 
context of people and organizations: “technology-practice is thus the 
application of scientific and other knowledge to practical tasks by 
ordered systems that inuolue people and organizations, living things 
and machines” (Pacey’s emphasis, p. 6).Technology practice is geared 
to specific contexts, which en tail cultural and organizational 
constraints. For example, a Dewey Decimal Classification used in 
a special library may be adapted to meet local needs and objectives. 
Recommendations for appropriate classification embodied in the 
Dewey rules may be overridden to suit organizational requirements. 
Thus intellectual technologies lead to forms of embodiment 
(classification schemes) which in turn, through the activities of 
trained or experienced professionals, lead to specific practices (e.g., 
classification of a particular text for a particular information-
seeking environment). But i t  should be a dialectical process: 
problems in particular classifications should lead to reflection on 
the forms of embodiment and the grounding intellectual 
technologies. Unfortunately, there are three reasons why this may 
not occur: (1) practices may pose insoluble problems-e.g., in 
hierarchical classification schemes, i t  is of ten difficult to expand 
the vocabulary, modify the meaning of a term, or describe complex 
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concepts (Meadow, 1967, p. 26); (2)practitioners may not communicate 
difficulties to classification rule makers; and (3)classification schemes 
have historical inertia and tend to be inflexible. 
A technological package, a third approach to technology, can 
be seen as an uprooted technological practice. A given technology 
is developed for a particular cultural and historical environment. 
Upon its success, the developers often attempt to generalize the 
technology by disengaging i t  from its original application. Examples 
include many library automation systems, such as NOTIS, which 
have been “home grown”-that is, built for a particular university 
setting; they then become a technological package marketed to other 
universities and applications. This deracination process lies at the 
core of the notion of a technological package, which has been adapted 
from Crowther’s (1986) characterization of information technologies: 
closely inter-related sets of hardware, software, . . . . human resource 
(and skill) requirements and guidelines, . , . which “work” or “function” 
together in a strictly technical sense (e.g.. reducible to a highly controlled 
laboratory situation), apart from contextual considerations, in order to 
produce or transform a good, service or standard. The technology becomes 
a technological package when it i s  labelled by a policy symbol and 
subjected to a series of technological utility and economic efficiency 
decisions. (p. 1) 
For Crowther, a technological package is the mechanism by which 
technology is transferred and therefore is the unit around which 
assessment occurs. It is an important notion because it  describes actual 
phenomena, and understanding its character helps one to understand 
the complexity, as well as occasional failures, of some transfers. The 
technological package is “a classic case of a technological solution 
looking for a problem to solve” (Rogers & Larsen, 1984, p. 269) without 
regard to the appropriateness of the problem or the context. 
ETHICALFRAMEWORKS 
With these distinctions in mind, two familiar philosophical 
positions can be introduced as frameworks for studying ethical 
considerations-i.e., Kantianism and utilitarianism. These positions 
do not of course exhaust the pluralism that exists in current ethical 
inquiry. Part of the difficulty in discussing applied ethics lies in 
developing some shared standards, difficult enough in the diversity 
of American culture and even more problematic in an intercultural 
context. Yet the positions of Kant and utilitarianism were chosen 
because, according to Kohlberg (1976), they are dominant and 
commonly held across cultures. (Kohlberg has claimed that these two 
positions are stages in a process of moral development that is shared 
across cultures. He argued that there were six definable stages in 
the moral development of persons. The stages were divided into three 
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levels: preconventional, conventional, and post-conventional 
morality. In the latter two levels, the ones characteristic of mature 
morality, each stage reflects the utilitarian and Kantian position 
respectively, but the latter level has a deeper appropriation based 
on a personal commitment to a sense of justice rather than social 
determination [conventional morality is based on shared norms and 
values that sustain groups and societies]. People who progress through 
these levels or positions do not necessarily know their philosophical 
names, originators, or advocates. Nevertheless, if Kohlberg is correct, 
they come to live according to these positions as their ethical 
development matures. Although there are some difficulties and 
challenges to Kohlberg’s position, for the sake of establishing a 
springboard, the focus will be on the utilitarian and Kantian aspects 
of conventional morality [level 21, since they seem to be the guiding 
ethical views of many cases of technology transfer.) Even if people, 
transferrers and transferees alike, do not know their names, they 
practice behavior that can be described in Kantian or utilitarian terms. 
THEKANTIANAPPROACH 
The Kantian position of the “categorical imperative” appears 
to be a rationalization for the golden rule: do unto others as you 
would have them do unto you. One of Kant’s (1959) formulations 
of the categorical imperative is: “Act so that you treat humanity, 
whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end 
and never merely as a means” (p. 47). Kant admonishes us to treat 
ourselves and other people as ends worthy of respect and never merely 
as means. 
Kant’s position was formulated as a personal ethic: in fact ethics 
for Kant was anthropocentric, dealing with man’s relation to himself 
or other men. The stakeholders in technology transfer, however, can 
be persons, groups, or institutions of various sorts-i.e., governments, 
corporations, foundations, nonprofit agencies, scientific committees, 
or countries. In this article, institution will be used as a generic 
term to cover these various collectivities. To extend the value of the 
categorical imperative, one must include these institutions as actors, 
because they are entities with some degree of autonomy, with their 
own status and rights. Given the view in the United States that 
corporations have legal status as individual entities, one could 
simultaneously argue, as we for the moment will assume, that any 
institution can be accorded the status of moral agent. Philosophically, 
i t  is not easy to justify this assumption (especially for Kant where 
moral worth is traceable to a rational will), for collectivities, like 
governments and other institutions, exist only in and through 
individuals, and yet i t  is clear that governments and institutions make 
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choices. Their actions and directions represent a will for the 
institution as a whole. In this sense, institutions have an autonomous 
life. Assuming the moral agency of institutions, Kan t’s categorical 
imperative can be restated: treat all institutions not merely as means, 
but at the same time as ends in themselves. Just as an information 
professional, from this Kantian perspective, has no right to regard 
his employing institution as a mere means to his livelihood, 
organizations in both developed and developing countries must avoid 
being mere users of each other. 
With these views in mind, one could argue that Kant’s categorical 
imperative gives rise to three factors for ethical considerations in 
technology transfer: promotion of organization survival, preservation 
of individuality, and presence of goodwill. These can be compared 
to the four factors isolated by Rubin (1991) in a paper on “Ethical 
Issues in Library Personnel Managemen t”-organizational survival, 
individuality, social utility, and social responsibility. (The notion 
of principles implies settled rules of action. But these considerations 
are less rules than constituent elements that contribute to the moral 
deliberation that leads to a choice and/or action, upon an appeal 
to some ethical principles, like fairness or justice. Ethical principles 
imply sets of values or rules that are invoked in the process of weighing 
these diverse factors.) The factor of organizational survival, derived 
from Thompson’s Organizations in Action (1967), originates in the 
view that a fundamental function of an organization is to perpetuate 
itself so that the organization survives and prospers. While Thompson 
derives this consideration by analogy to the moral self-interest of 
individuals found in the work of Locke and Hobbes, it appears to 
be associated with the Kantian notion of the autonomy of the will 
from the version of the categorical imperative quoted earlier: “Act 
so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that 
of another, always as an end and never merely as a means” (emphasis 
added, p. 47). If institutions have moral agency, they also are ends, 
never to be treated merely as means. This implies, as Rubin suggests, 
that those who run or serve institutions have an obligation to make 
the organization as efficient as possible for serving organizational 
ends (otherwise they would be treating organizations as mere means 
in themselves). 
But in the world of information professionals, there is a related 
consideration-survival of the profession. Each profession is also 
never merely a means but an end and must be granted rights of 
survival. One of the origins of ethical conflict is precisely the clash 
between organizational and professional survival: on occasion, 
obligations to the profession may override organizational sur viva1 
or vice versa. For example, if an information professional is asked 
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to pad the account of a client with inappropriate online searches, 
this activity may promote institutional survival but at the expense 
of professional survival. Since this factor applies to organizations 
and professions, it might be better called the principle of institutional 
survival. 
There is another dimension of survival that must be included 
in contemporary ethical discussions, that of planetary survival. The 
advent of technologies with large-scale impacts have changed the 
character of the ethical arena. These changes have led Jonas (1984) 
to create new formulations of Kant’s categorical imperative: “Do not 
compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of 
humanity on earth,” or “Act so that the effects of your action are 
compatible with the permanence of genuine human life” (p. 11). 
Paradoxically, these versions of the imperative move away from Kant’s 
focus on intentional states and move toward the utilitarian mode 
of thinking, as they necessarily focus on the consequences of an action, 
and so these versions will be taken up during the discussion of 
utilitarianism. 
Like the factor of institutional survival, the factors related to 
individuality are founded on the original versions of the categorical 
imperative. People are individuals in an organization and ends in 
themselves. Their individuality must be respected, and Rubin argues 
that they should have as much freedom in the marketplace as 
practicable. Rubin adds: “Restrictions on employee conduct and 
expression require a valid rationale. In other words, the Principle 
of Individuality implies that all rules, regulations and punishments 
should have a clear rationale, i.e., ‘just cause’ ” (p. 8). This principle 
can be applied to organizations as well. Organizations should have 
as much freedom as possible, and restrictions on organizational 
behavior in the marketplace should have “just cause.” For this reason, 
the principle might be better called the principle of autonomy, since 
it  affirms the autonomy of individuals and organizations in pursuing 
their goals subject only to constraints based on just cause (e.g., the 
prevention of environmental pollution). 
Some further clarifications of Kant’s position can be productive 
here. At the center of Kant’s moral philosophy is the notion of a 
good will. A good will is an unqualified good, unlike other kinds 
of goods-for example, wealth, power, or information technologies- 
which can be abused. A good will is a will that acts for the sake 
of duty. When an action is performed because of the belief that i t  
is right, i t  accrues moral worth for the person acting. In Kant’s view, 
it is not because good consequences are achieved that an action is 
good; rather, an action is good when it was attempted because it  
was the right thing to do (e.g., the action of providing agricultural 
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information to a developing country with problems of starvation 
is good despite the fact that a drought destroyed the crops). Somewhat 
problematically, Kant disassociates a good will from inclination. Kant 
believes that an action is hardly moral if we are inclined to do i t  
anyway-e.g., a corporation that gives away computers to universities 
or developing countries because of tax write-offs or obsolescence of 
models is performing actions that have no moral worth even if the 
consequences are good. The  reason, according to Kant, is that, 
although its actions were in accord with moral duty, they were not 
done for the sake of that duty. 
Kant seems to imply that there must be a certain level of 
consciousness in moral action-i.e., one must be aware that what 
one is doing is in accord with one’s duty. This notion seems to run 
contrary to the Aristotelian view that moral worth is related to 
properly acquired moral habits. For example, if a person or institution 
is in the habit of donating obsolescent models of computers to 
charitable causes, such actions are morally praiseworthy because they 
are in accord with good character formation and not because the 
institutions are conscious of their duty. They are the kind of actions 
a good person of good character would perform. One would think 
that Kant would agree, but he seems to insist on a certain level of 
awareness of duty. 
Given that this motivation is the element that supplies moral 
worth, Kant must determine some objective content for the moral 
law. He reasons that you should “act only according to that maxim 
by which you can at the same time will that i t  should become a 
universal law” (p. 39). In this version of the categorical imperative, 
Kant is suggesting that an action is morally acceptable if the doer 
of that action could wish that the principle that guides it become 
a universal law. For example, one could not wish that lying become 
a universal law; if i t  did, communication of fact would become 
impossible since not everyone would make the same assumptions 
on the basis of what they were told. 
Kant does not imply that concrete laws of conduct can be deduced 
directly from the categorical imperative; rather i t  operates as a 
criterion for judging the morality of subjective principles of conduct 
which Kant calls maxims. Suppose that I choose to supply agricultural 
information for use in a poor rural area where there are no  proprietary 
rights on the information or its use. The maxim of this action is: 
I will provide technological and scientific information to needy 
countries or people, where the supply of that information will not 
infringe on  copyright, misuse of employer’s resources (e.g., 
duplicating costs), etc. I ask myself whether I could will that this 
maxim become a universal law, namely that anybody in a position 
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such as mine would do the same, and decide that I can so will it. 
Hence the maxim is morally justified. Interestingly, in terms of this 
example, there may be some who would feel justified in the misuse 
of employer’s resources and/or in the infringement of copyright, for 
example, if they deemed that a higher good would be served, namely, 
the alleviation of famine, disease, or poverty. Kant would have 
difficulty in endorsing such actions as acceptable moral law, precisely 
because he sees justice and universality tied together. For him, it 
is still a matter of stealing, albeit from the rich to the poor, and 
to wish that i t  become a universal law would be to advocate actions 
inconsistent with fundamental notions of morality, namely, justice, 
fairness, and contracts. 
Through the criterion of universalizability, one can determine 
the admissibility of certain maxims into a proper ethical code. So 
the maxim, “steal information from vendors or employers, everyone 
else does,” is inconsistent when universalized-i.e., vendors and 
employers would cease to exist if everyone stole from them. Kant‘s 
position is often called a formalism since it only determines the form 
of the moral law (universalizability) and not its content. 
In the context of technology transfer, whether considering a 
technology, a technology practice, or a technological package, the 
Kantian approach is embodied by those for whom good will is a 
valuable and moral asset, supplying a proper motivation for the 
distribution of scientific and technological information and 
experience for the promotion of economic development. Although 
tangible results are hoped for in the transfer process, their failure 
to occur does not detract from the basic morality of the situation- 
i.e., that individuals and institutions of whatever variety should 
operate with good will and treat each other as ends and not merely 
as means. On the other hand, Kant’s view also accords with one’s 
intuitive feeling that if a technological package is foisted on a 
developing country sheerly on the basis of a profit motive for the 
developer, that action is morally questionable despite beneficial 
results. 
THEUTILITARIANPERSPECTIVE 
John Stuart Mill (1957) explains the utilitarian principle: 
The creed which accFpts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the 
Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion 
as they promote happiness, wrong as they promote thr reverse of 
happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absmce of pain; 
by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure. (p. 10) 
The utilitarian position focuses on results or consequences, striving, 
as i t  does, for the maximum amount of happiness for the most number 
of people. Mill’s position is a modified hedonism; he believes that 
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most people seek happiness or pleasure as an end, but he attempts 
to apply this to the entire social setting. The slogan of the utilitarians, 
“the greatest happiness of the greatest number,” is hrected toward 
both a wide and a just distribution of pleasure and its maximization. 
It is because the distribution was supposed to be both broad 
and just that Mill’s views have had wide impact. One interpretation 
of Mill argues that i t  implies that people should enjoy rights to 
the basic necessities of life-i.e., adequate food, housing, a job, and 
favorable working conditions. In fact, politicians, social activists, 
judges, and decision makers of all varieties have adopted his beliefs 
in the creation of social programs, legislation, and plans for economic 
development. The attempt to bring about the general happiness 
represents their method of implementing utilitarian principles. Smart 
sees behind utilitarianism the “motive of generalized benevolence” 
(in DeMarco, 1986, p. 26), and one can see this motive behind the 
use of technology transfer for economic development and for 
supporting the “modernization cycle,” a process in which developing 
countries undertake technologies to improve the general conditions 
of their societies. 
One may understand the dynamics, benefits, and difficulties of 
utilitarianism by employing an example. Take the case where the 
personnel of an agricultural library in a developing country are 
deciding whether to automate its library system. Such a system would 
supply many benefits-e.g., improved agricultural production 
through the availability of knowledge of crops, techniques for 
enhancing crop culture, and avoiding or inhibiting crop diseases and 
pests; increased income for farmers; and increased prosperity and 
health because of adequate or increased harvests. But not only would 
i t  supply benefits, but also the benefits would be superior-i.e., the 
easy availability of agricultural information, increased speed of access 
to such information, the elimination of much irrelevant information, 
and elimination of the work required to duplicate research results 
of the information. From these benefits, certain deficits must be 
subtracted-i.e., reliance on externally created technologies, depletion 
of financial resources and increased indebtedness to developed 
countries, difficulty in getting skilled human resources to run and 
maintain the operation, increased educational requirements for 
creating such human resources with reliance on developed countries 
or companies for training, increased educational requirements for 
users needed to overcome language and technophobic barriers, higher 
unemployment due to technological replacement of the large numbers 
of personnel typically employed in a manual system, difficulties in 
fostering the need for information on the part of the end-users, 
difficulties in enhancing the literacy standards so that end-users can 
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use the information, the consequences of misused or misapplied 
technologies (e.g., use of inappropriate pesticides or incorrect 
dosages), the consequences of inappropriate technologies (e.g., use 
of dangerous pesticides), increased “brain drain” by loss of bright 
students who emigrate to developed countries. These benefits and 
deficits must be added up  within individuals and across individuals 
to arrive at a general sum. This sum is to include those consequences 
that are associated not only with the present, but also those associated 
with the immediate and remote future. A long-range ecological 
disaster would ultimately devalue a high level of current general 
happiness. Furthermore, the availability of the information and its 
use for increased agricultural production should not unduly favor 
one segment of the population (e.g., rich landowners) at the expense 
of another (e.g., poor local farmers). For utilitarians and other 
consequentialists, an action is moral if i t  promotes the long-range 
general happiness for the most people and/or if it inhibits the general 
amount of displeasure. 
This example illustrates a number of critical features of 
utilitarianism. These include: (1) a distinction among pleasures in 
terms of quality; (2) the additive nature of benefits and deficits; (3) that 
there is a temporal factor that must be considered in calculating the 
general happiness; (4)that the general happiness is a good to every 
individual; and ( 5 )  that there should be a just distribution of the 
benefits. Let us move on to a delineation of the problems associated 
with such a view. 
Not all forms of utilitarianism (e.g., the theories of Bentham) 
have argued for qualitative distinctions among pleasures, but it was 
a view that Mill (1957) supported and demonstrated in his famous 
assertion that it “is better to be a human being dissatisfied than 
a pig satisfied” (p.14). In certain areas it seems to be justified: increased 
agricultural production due to increased knowledge and experience 
is superior to local agricultural production bound to sheer “grunt 
work” because of inappropriate technologies (e.g., failure to rotate 
crops). In other contexts, it can be hazardous to associate labels of 
inferiority or superiority with physical or mental pleasures (e.g., is 
sex inferior to book reading?), because these pleasures are variously 
good at diverse times and are not a matter of inferiority or superiority. 
Inferiority as a label is often employed only to indicate abuse or 
fixation on certain kinds of pleasure, typically physical. 
Not all “grunt work” farming may be bad. Given some good 
information about appropriate techniques, such production may be 
environmentally safer and instill large amounts of self-esteem for 
the farmers. Part of the problem for Mill is that he wants to make 
qualitative distinctions based on pleasure. If one makes qualitative 
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distinctions among pleasures, it is not on the basis of some difference 
in pleasure that these are made but according to other values. The 
superiority of informed agricultural production versus grunt work 
production is not simply a matter of pleasure (i t  is true that less 
physical effort may be involved and there may be increased 
production, but these are quantitative measures) but of other values- 
i.e., freedom from ignorance, increased knowledge, better control of 
and relationship to nature, more leisure time. 
Mill attempts to establish these differences in quality on the basis 
of a competent judge. He argues that if one of two pleasures is preferred 
by people who are competently acquainted with both, “even though 
knowing it  to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and 
[who] would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure,” 
the preferred pleasure is superior in quality (p. 12). Mill’s description 
has to do with weighing quantitative and qualitative pleasures within 
the individual, but our example generalizes to social dimensions. 
Determining and weighing qualitative and quantitative pleasures in 
the aggregate has always been a difficult problem, especially in matters 
bearing upon the public sector. In matters of the public interest, 
who are to be regarded as the competent judges: politicians, scientists, 
or pollsters (reflecting a consensus of the general population)? In 
matters of technology transfer it is more difficult to decide since the 
experts presumably must be competent to assess a technology from 
the viewpoints of both the donor and receiving cultures. The problem 
is aggravated if the technology is newly applied, because there is 
little knowledge of the potential or actual consequences. Even the 
methods of technology assessments are geared to the donor culture, 
and they may be inappropriate for the receiving culture. If the experts 
are attached to the donor culture, they may have a serious lack of 
understanding of the receiving culture-i.e., its needs and traditions. 
If they are in the receiving culture, they may not be able to fully 
assess the effects of the technology in itself and more so in its 
application to their own culture. 
As an alternative judge, one might resort to appealing to a 
consensus by major players or the public in a sort of “participatory 
technology”-e.g., if the public is given sufficient informaion, it will 
come to a consensus about what technology it will need or reject. 
Brooks (1973) indicates the problems with this view: 
This seems an unrealistic hope. What is more likely to happen with 
greater participation, as traditionally visualized, is that any adversely 
affected group or interest can exercise a veto power over a technological 
enterprise, almost regardless of other affected interests or values. 
Unfortunately, all policy, including that relative to technology, requires 
a measure of both consistency and continuity among objectives, which 
is difficult to reconcile with participatory democracy in the decision 
process. (p. 255) 
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Nonetheless, this is precisely the strategy recommended by Noar (1982) 
with respect to the social responsibility of multinational corporations 
to operate in a “socially desirable manner.” What is socially desirable 
is to be determined on the basis of whether activities will be seen 
to bring about welfare improvements in the countries in which the 
companies exist. “Periodic public opinion polls, or more informal 
methods in the less developed countries, are seen to provide the 
necessary inputs for the overall corporate guidelines for action, which 
in turn will influence strategic corporate decisions” (p. 219). To 
reiterate Brooks, this seems naive, since it is not clear that those 
polled could really understand or predict the consequences or 
nonconsequences of a corporate course of action. 
Implied in the discussion so far is that pleasures (whether 
qualitative or quantitative) are additive in some way, and that these 
pleasures and pains can be computed into a sort of aggregate 
happiness. But this calculus of pleasures must be examined. In some 
instances, two pleasures can enhance the individual pleasures. Using 
the example of the agricultural library, there would be greater 
happiness if both the citations were available online and the source 
documents were immediately available than if there were source 
documents alone (with few or faulty access points in a manual system) 
or online references alone, with months needed to obtain the source 
documents, if they were at all available. In other instances, two 
pleasures may be in conflict, as, for example, trying to promote full 
employment while simultaneously trying to automate the agricultural 
library in a country with a large population and little local 
technological resources or expertise. On other occasions, a pleasure 
may even be enhanced with the addition of a pain, as when the 
successful implementation of an automated system is enhanced by 
the number and degree of difficulties overcome, such as low 
availability of capital, language barriers, unstable governments, low 
prestige of information professionals, lack of available trained 
personnel, and poor existing information infrastructures (Eres, 1981, 
p. 99). In simple comparisons, one often can make a judgment, but 
when one combines all these factors, i t  is difficult to estimate overall 
results. For example, in the plans to automate the agricultural library, 
one would have to take into account the unhappiness of all those 
who remained unemployed and their offspring-i.e., the unhappiness 
of the government in reduced tax revenues because of reduced 
employment; all the happiness of the patrons due to the quick easy 
efficient access to the materials of the library; their unhappiness when 
the equipment breaks down; and the unhappiness caused by reliance 
on external suppliers and the cost of acquiring, maintaining, and 
repairing the equipment. 
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There is also a temporal element in the computation, since the 
consequences to be considered are not simply the current ones but 
those in the future as well. At the extreme, one must take into account 
the effects of a technology transfer on the survival and quality of 
life on planet earth in the distant future. As noted earlier, Jonas 
(1984) believes that Kant’s ethics are inadequate to deal with 
contemporary situations. Previously, man’s actions had little effect 
on the self-sustaining character of nature or on the ability of the 
planet to sustain life. Now actions undertaken by whatever individual 
or institution, be i t  corporation, government, or social agency, can 
have grave consequences for life on the planet. In the new ethics, 
increased knowledge is vital to proper moral decision making 
especially where actions involve or promote these serious conse- 
quences. Hence, Jonas (1984) reformulates Kan t’s imperative: “Act 
so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence 
of genuine human life”; or “Act so that the effects of your action 
are not destructive of the future possibility of such life” (p. 11). 
Although these formulations remind us to avoid ecological disaster, 
they make two shifts from the original Kantian perspective. First, 
they heighten the role of knowledge. For Kant, the knowledge required 
for ethical decision making was not that of a scientist or expert, 
but “of a kind readily available to a man of good will” (p. 5 ) ,  a 
man of common sense. The impact of one’s actions did not have 
consequences except for the foreseeable future. Current moral action 
requires “predictive knowledge,” but paradoxically, as Jonas points 
out, such knowledge is unavailable since man lacks experience in 
the long-range effects of certain actions upon the life of the planet. 
So a dilemma appears: on the one hand, the need for knowledge 
of consequences as a prerequisite for performing utilitarian 
calculation, and on the other, the inadequacy of predictive knowledge. 
This is especially perplexing for developing countries for two reasons: 
(1) they are more vulnerable to a lack of knowledge of consequences 
(both in terms of the technology and of its application to their 
environment); and (2) technologies, such as the use of certain 
pesticides that are no longer tolerated in developed countries, are 
of ten foisted on them by unscrupulous businessmen. Even though 
these technologies may be recognized as harmful, they are often 
tolerated because they are cheap and because they offset other large- 
scale problems such as severe shortages in food supply. 
Thus the utilitarian computation of the consequences of 
technology transfer is complicated by many additive and temporal 
factors. When a decision maker opts for the importation of a 
technology such as computer hardware and software for automation, 
he must consider the current and future benefits of all affected 
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persons-e.g., the benefits to be derived from the avoidance of hunger, 
poverty, disease, and ignorance; economic growth and development; 
stimulation of research and productivity; and increased stature in 
the international community. From this aggregate he must subtract 
the cost of the technology and the resultant dependency i t  fosters; 
those adverse consequences resulting from misapplied technology as 
in the improper use of pesticides; environmental costs including the 
depletion of natural resources, pollution, and long-range (and of ten 
unknown) adverse consequences including those that may affect life 
on the planet; costs of science policy development and imple-
mentation; costs of the failure of anticipated results; and the erosion 
of cultural identity. If the moral quality of a choice for a transfer 
of technology depends on its consequences (as the teleological 
dimension of utilitarianism suggests), there will be a long wait to 
determine the verdict of such a choice. 
Furthermore, there is an uneasy relationship between the 
individual’s happiness and general happiness in utilitarianism. Mill 
suggests that since each person’s happiness is a good to that person, 
the general happiness is a good to everybody. Taken at face value, 
this is the fallacy of division, arguing that a property associated with 
the whole must be associated with the parts. One could imagine 
that with our agricultural library, some individuals may very well 
be unhappy, despite an increase in the general well-being of the 
society. Farmers who were excluded from use of the library because 
of economic, educational, or other barriers, and thus excluded from 
implementing the information contained therein through appro- 
priate technologies, would discover the falling value of their current 
production efforts, making them unable to earn a living and sustain 
a family. On a positive side, economic growth in a country as a 
general good does tend to facilitate economic growth throughout 
a society. But such growth may disproportionately favor some 
constituents at the expense of others. 
This suggests another problem: utilitarianism aims for a just 
distribution of those goods. Given the greatest happiness principle, 
a corresponding principle of justice to which utilitarians should 
appeal is that the allocation of resources should be such that there 
will be the most happiness for the most number of people. In the 
case of a developing country, funding decisions for technology 
transfers would address the more fundamental problems of a society- 
i.e., poverty, starvation, disease. Funds might go to a medical facility 
first before they would go to the agricutlural library. Or would they? 
Which are the more fundamental problems? Would a best-
maximization principle imply a single obvious, well-defined course 
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of action or set of priorities, when there are conflicting goods or 
conflicting competing avenues for combating sundry evils? 
For example, in the agricultural library, conflicts are bound to 
arise between organizational demands and social responsibilities. As 
noted earlier, Rubin (1990) has suggested difficulties in balancing 
the factors of social responsibility, social utility, and institutional 
survival (p. 6).In the context of library personnel management, factors 
related to social utility are concerned with promoting the greater 
good of society within the context of the organization’s goals. 
Personnel managers must maximize resources to promote the public 
good. For the agricultural library, the budget would have to be 
allocated so that i t  would best fulfill its mission-i.e., to provide 
agricultural information to those sectors of the society most in need 
of it. In this manner, i t  would fulfill both the goals of social utility 
and institutional survival. 
But social responsibility is concerned with advancing the larger 
goals of a developing country. In this respect, the library may be 
inclined to hire more staff than it  needs (to enhance national full 
employment demands) and to hire less qualified but native citizens 
(to inhibit economic dependence on external countries); i t  may 
concern itself more closely with the problems of the impoverished 
and ignorant through such things as literacy and outreach programs 
(as opposed to serving the needs of the wealthy and privileged); may 
acquiesce in cutting budgets (so that critical problems in other areas 
of the economy may be addressed); may defer automation (to increase 
employment and to avoid dependence on external technologies). 
These choices would aim for a harmonious society in which all or 
most people would enjoy basic rights to food, shelter, clothing, 
education, etc. 
Such a concern for social responsibility, however, would often 
stand in tension with institutional survival since losses entailed by 
actions promoting social responsibility would infringe on a library’s 
economic well-being. Promotion of organizational survival fosters 
an organization that is efficient and economical. The agricultural 
library fulfills its goals by minimizing staff requirements, by hiring 
only the best-educated and most highly skilled workers, by purchasing 
only the most reliable technology, and so on. In this respect, the 
unhappiness of some individuals (e.g., those who fail to gain 
employment or other benefits from the system) would be overriden 
in favor of the greater social good. In addition, poor personnel 
practices would also deflate the profession’s standing, a matter of 
special concern in developing countries where the value and prestige 
of trained professionals is not well established. Thus professional 
survival would also be threatened. And the promotion of the library’s 
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social utility function-to provide agricultural information-may 
also be impaired by expending resources on programs or actions 
promoting social responsibility. The choice of a technology, including 
information technology, is bound to many competing demands and 
to many uncertain results. Yet the utilitarian calculus demands- 
whatever the choices-a projection of results. 
REINTERPRETING TERMSMILLIN CONTEMPORARY 
Such choices based on calculations of the general happiness have 
been undertaken. The apparatus of utilitarianism has taken on several 
guises in contemporary life. In the context of technology transfer, 
it is actualized under the rubric of technology needs assessment, a 
preliminary analysis of an LDC’s needs and capabilities, so that 
appropriate technologies can be imported for economic development, 
and a trajectory for successful technology transfer may be established. 
Hetman (1973) reformulates the utilitarian principle in contemporary 
economic terms: “a mass society devoted to maximizing economic 
growth and the average expectancy of material well-being” (p. 258), 
accomplished by a technology that “has to be put at the service of 
the economy” (p. 257). Such technology incorporation is part of the 
“modernization cycle” for developing countries so that they can 
effectively deal with their local problems and can learn to compete 
in the world market or to participate in the “New International 
Economic Order.” Hetman’s assessment entails three parts: 
technological utility, social relevance, and political acceptability. 
With respect to the first part, a reason for introducing a technology 
is to gain some sizable advantage with respect to existing technologies. 
In order to determine this, the available technologies and their 
variants must be explored as a set of options. With respect to the 
second issue, each option must be subjected to a test of social relevance 
that includes assessment of direct economic costs and benefits and 
all other identifiable effects and impacts (on the environment, society, 
individuals, and values). Following an assessment of social relevance 
with each option, political acceptability must be determined-e.g., 
it might be the case that the preferred options, though socially relevant 
or technologically useful, may not be politically acceptable. This 
acceptability : 
must be ascertained through a multi-constituency procedure where 
impacts on affected parties are examined and evaluated in terms 
commensurate with those expressing overall social relevance. Depending 
on the importance given to values of various social and political groups, 
several socio-political alternatives can be formulated. The final step is 
the choice of an acceptable alternative which appears most suitable in 
a given socio-political context. (Hetman, 1973, pp. 268-69) 
In terms of information technologies, this process is further 
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complicated because traditional cost benefit analysis may not apply 
to the ultimate product of such technologies-i.e., information or 
knowledge. Even though one hears of the “economics of in-
formation,” the phrase is misleading since traditional economics, 
based on supply and demand, cannot be readily applied to 
information. As Eres (1981) notes: “Knowledge is cumulative and 
generally unquan tifiable. The process of acquiring knowledge is 
complex. An article read today might trigger research in 20 years” 
(p. 98). One cannot predict the long-range effects of the acquisition 
of information. Although there is a commodity sense to information, 
it is derived from the containers of information-i.e., a specific 
physical unit such as a document, book, microfiche, online citation, 
or text. But information is not properly quantifiable, and one could 
argue that the commodity sense is incidental to the real meaning 
of the term. Information, as Fox (1982) points out, is not a count 
noun but is related to the “propositional content” of a text or texts, 
what the texts affirm or deny. If information is a unit in this sense, 
i t  is elusive since any unitization occurs ultimately through the 
meaning that the information creates in the information seeker’s 
mind, where different parts, sources, and elements of texts are bound. 
For example, an information seeker’s understanding of technology 
may have been acquired through a variety of texts, references, and 
sources, and the unit of comprehension must be traced back to all 
these sources. Even when we associate information with a particular 
text or journal, one cannot readily determine the effects of its absence 
from a collection (Kent, 1974, p. 303). How can we estimate how 
the absence of a text or the absence of online or on -dm searching 
prolonged or wasted the work of other researchers? Although we 
do know that such absences have important effects, calculating the 
consequences of their absence is close to impossible. Brooks (1973) 
claims the same is true of technology: “The problems of assessing 
the absence of a technology can be much more difficult than assessing 
any particular proposed technology” (p. 249). 
Setting apart for the moment the difficulties of quantitatively 
assessing the consequences of information or information 
technologies, the iterative process suggested by Hetman earlier is only 
to determine whether to undertake a certain technology, but utilitarian 
principles demand some computation through the whole process, 
including actual consequences. Unfortunately, a technology chosen 
for transfer is not necessarily created, implemented, maintained, or 
used in harmony with the objectives for which it was originally 
assessed. And the secondary effects may have more impact than the 
original direct intended effects. Dede (1981) asserts: 
Research in  the field of technology assessment has shown that the 
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unintended, second order effects of a technological innovation on society 
are frequently more influential, long-term than its direct and deliberate 
effects. For example, in many crowded areas one can travel by car no 
faster than by horse-the greater speed of the automobile has been lost 
through congestion-but automotive pollution and petroleum 
availability remain as major societal concerns. (p. 204) 
According to Crowther (1986), technology transfer is constructive 
when the following conditions are supported: the capacity to 
determine a country’s major socioeconomic problems and to translate 
them into a coherent set of technological requirements; the 
marshaling of the population to innovate, implement, and deal with 
the effects of the innovation; simplified presentation and ample 
diffusion of information regarding the technological options; an 
analysis of hardware and software requirements and costing of these 
items; and an awareness of the ideological or social value content 
to technologies and technical decisions (p. 2). Unfortunately, 
Crowther’s experience with information services in Latin American 
countries indicates that these conditions are countervailed, and the 
information technologies adopted by the services “enhances the 
personal value and not necessarily the national development value 
of the information” (p. 3). 
Not only are intended consequences often sabotaged, the long- 
range general happiness in the form of basic developmental needs 
is sacrificed for immediate goods. For example, Akin M. Makinde 
(in Murphy et al., 1986), explains the imbalance of happiness caused 
by the oil found in Nigeria: 
As long as the oil revenues lasted, Nigerians lavished their foreign 
exchange on innovations that were completely unrelated to their basic 
developmental needs. In fact, agriculture, the major source of foreign 
exchange, was abandoned as the population gravitated to big cities to 
enjoy the products of technology....The desire to enjoy foreign 
technological products has led to a wide gulf between the rich and the 
poor, with contractors of technological products and government officials 
becoming millionaires overnight. In fact, it is now estimated that a few 
individuals in Nigeria have more money than the national treasury! (pp. 
182-83) 
The considerations that we have looked at so far are concerned 
with technological practices and consequences and with technology 
transfers in the form of technological packages, inappropriately 
uprooted, and applied or implemented practices. But leaving the 
discussion at this point would seem to imply that the problem lies 
only in the practice or in the package or in its implementation but 
not in the technology itself or in the marketplace of the available 
technologies. 
Consider that there is an information problem in an LDC looking 
for a technological solution. Given this kind of problem, there is 
a belief in a free marketplace of available information technologies, 
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similar to the notion of the free marketplace of ideas. There exists 
a marketplace of goods and services of all available information 
technologies. From this marketplace any developing country can 
freely choose any technology in terms of the problem under 
consideration. Given that the technologies adequately address the 
needs or problems of the developing country, these technologies are 
supposedly of equal value. But just as in the free marketplace of 
ideas, one cannot assume that competition has pruned the market 
to the best or the most appropriate: some technologies may dominate, 
occlude, or exclude more efficient ones. One merely has to think 
of the domination of IBM in setting standards for the computer 
market, especially in the personal computer market, even in the face 
of its confused strategies and some poorly conceived products. In 
information technologies, Library of Congress and Dewey classi- 
fications have commanded the classification market, and the 
commercial bibliographic retrieval systems have established Boolean, 
deductive systems as the standard. In cataloging, OCLC has 
dominated the market, and although it  has not captured the market, 
i t  sets standards with which other catalogers must contend. 
There are many reasons for this uneven marketplace-e.g., 
historical events, economics, and consequences of past choices. Given 
the need for economies of scale, the range of economically feasible 
designs for a technology is limited. With respect to the use of 
information technology in an educational setting, Dede (1981) 
remarks: “In brief the educational quality of the device (or 
instructional unit) and the profit margin of the manufacturer will 
be inversely related” (p.206).Furthermore, he asserts: “Market forces, 
if the sole criterion ...,will dictate that the educational hardware and 
software produced be designed for the needs of the largest and richest 
body of consumers: the middle and upper class majority culture” 
(p. 211). Given the availability of such software and hardware, i t  
is not hard to understand the emergence of technological packages 
(e.g., computer hardware and software) that are then foisted into 
inappropriate settings or used for inappropriate problems. 
And it  is easy to foresee the motives of information technology 
salespersons in their assessing and addressing the needs of developing 
countries. If one were to adopt a more cynical attitude, one could 
argue that these motives are suspect. Mowshowitz (1984) calls 
computer literacy a “euphemism for consumer training. It should 
take only a moment’s reflection to realize who stands to gain the 
most by promoting computer literacy. Is it the free choice of a neutral 
technology that is bringing computers into the schools?” In view 
of the developing countries’ drive to enter the modernization cycle, 
can one really speak of the free choice of neutral, equally available 
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technologies? That is to say, not only are the available technologies 
unequal, the prevailing belief that technologies are neutral is 
mistaken (Mowshowitz, 1984; Froehlich, 1990). Every technology is 
undertaken with a technological practice in mind and is bound to 
a set of values for which it was undertaken. Technological packaging 
attempts to hide these value-laden roots, but proper needs assessment 
must uncover these values to ensure their appropriateness and utility 
for the problems to be solved. 
Crow ther (1988) remarks that technological development opposes 
the modernization cycle, since the cycle focuses on the technology 
rather than the context and purpose for its use: 
The modernization cycle is inherently contradictory to technological 
development. It is the proper function of the technology itself rather 
than human or natural environmental stress, that is monitored and 
corrected; technology assessment in this cycle explicitly emphasizes 
technological utility and economic efficiency rather than social relevance 
or  political consequences, and commercial criteria override the 
consideration of basic needs. (p. 8) 
The choices from the marketplace are uneven and so put constraints 
on the fulfilling of objectives. And decision makers, in facing the 
available choices, are not necessarily guided by utilitarian principles 
and needs assessment. 
In the context of technology transfer, there are necessary unhappy 
choices-e.g., when budgets and resources are limited, some members 
will be serviced before others. Mechanisms to develop and facilitate 
agricultural or medical information transfer may be given higher 
priority than educational information or vice versa. As noted earlier, 
the content of the greater good or the maximized happiness or 
minimized displeasure is not achieved through utilitarian principles 
or through an abstract notion of justice, but by setting priorities 
and solving problems in turn. Taylor (1985), in an essay on “The 
Diversity of Goods,” suggests that this is precisely an area where 
utilitarianism founders-that i t  assumes homogeneity of goods where 
actually only conflicting heterogeneity exists (p. 244). Each 
stakeholder comes to the deliberation process of determining the 
greater good with different traditions and different priorities. Such 
differences are of ten amplified by the differences between developed 
countries and LDCs and within LDCs by competing segments of 
the society with diverse cultural backgrounds. Thus there is a diversity 
of competing goods (not clear goods opposing clear evils) or, more 
often, a diversity of competing evils (which area of the economy 
to address first-poverty, ignorance, disease?) for which utilitarianism 
supplies no governing principles for choices. Although it  can be 
agreed that there is a greater good or a greater happiness, what the 
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greater good is and how it  should be actualized is fraught with difficult 
choices that are ultimately political. According to Brooks (1973): 
Although the consequences of various technological choices may be 
clarified by analysis, there is no objective or scientific basis on which 
final choices can be made. The choices themselves are political, depending 
on a complex interplay or bargaining process among conflicting 
economic, political and ideological interests and values. The chips in 
this bargaining game involve not only immediate choices at issue, but 
also unrelated perceptions and interests. For example, many people who 
opposed supersonic transport in the United States did so because it was 
a convenient symbol for uncontrolled technology, rather than because 
of its specific environmental impact or economic viability. (p. 251) 
Similarly, in addition to such good reasons for technology transfer 
as increasing the general welfare, there may be a series of reasons 
based on less desirable motives-e.g., prestige value of owning 
computer technology, centralization of power at the expense of 
democratic values, and vested interests. In the case of information 
technologies in particular, Katz (1988) sees politics as the driver of 
the diffusion of such technologies (pp. 47-78). 
The ideals of utilitarianism-i.e., its “generalized benevolence”- 
tend to be vulnerable to corruption because of the number and variety 
of stakeholders in the decision-making and implementation process 
and their diverse interpretations of what the general happiness is 
and how to best realize it, interpretations often colored by simple 
self-serving interests. Again the problematic relation of individual 
and collective happiness and the importance of motivations based 
on good will is seen here. The ethical can be confounded or clarified 
by the political, but the former seems to be more often the case since 
stakeholders, whether experts or members of a participatory 
technology, have such diverse perceptions and motivations. 
In sum, if we look at the application of utilitarian principles 
to issues of technology transfer in developing countries, we find that 
technology needs assessment is confounded on many fron ts-e.g., 
in lack of predictive knowledge for determining a set of effects; in 
difficulties in ensuring that the intended effects are achieved; in 
establishing priorities on reasonable grounds (either by experts or 
participants); in balancing competing demands of various factors or 
from differing interpretations of the greatest good and how it  may 
be achieved; in creating a fair distribution of goods; in uncovering 
the implicit values of technologies and technological packages; and 
in the constraints of available technologies. 
DIALECTIC THEMESOF THE KANTIANAND UTILITARIAN 
The difficulties surrounding the actualization of utilitarian 
principles, and the confusion surrounding the determination of 
results, do not invalidate utilitarianism as a moral perspective or 
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obviate the need for some mechanism of needs assessment (however 
flawed). It only underscores the difficulty of making choices among 
conflicting or competing goods and evils, ensuring intended effects, 
and making overall assessments. Attempts to define moral choices 
pale in the face of poverty, starvation, disease, and ignorance: how 
can citizens of an LDC hope to enjoy an ethical life if their basic 
needs are severely compromised? The Mother Theresas and social 
activists of the world have long recognized the fundamental necessity 
of providing for basic needs. 
Part of the problem of contemporary culture, as suggested by 
Jonas (1984), is that we are forced to endorse the utilitarian view, 
and the calculus of happiness takes the upper hand. Ellul (1980) 
asserts that technological morality has two characteristics: “( 1) it is 
behavioral (in other words, only correct practice, not intentions nor 
motivations, counts); and (2) i t  rules out the problematics of 
traditional morality (the morality of ambiguity is unacceptable in 
a technological world)” (p. 244). For Ellul, all moral evaluation, 
including that required in technology transfer, is forced into the 
utilitarian framework. Utilitarianism is, of course, not wrong per 
se, but its domination as a sole moral perspective and its sacrifice 
of the ethical to the political is problematic. It offends the intuitive 
notion that morality should be related to good intentions and good 
will. 
One could argue the other side of the case as well: proper 
motivation and good will are not the only basis for moral evaluation. 
Good motivations that fail to produce beneficial results will not serve 
the severe problems that confront LDCs. Although the calculus of 
utilitarianism or needs assessment is difficult to perform, so too are 
Kant’s motives elusive: proper motivation and good will can be faked, 
they are not readily discernible, and our perceptions may be unreliable. 
This invisibility of real motives is probably the source, at least in 
part, of the ambiguity of “traditional morality,” the ground of its 
unacceptability to “technological morality.” Motives are neither 
verifiable nor quantifiable. Furthermore, technology transfer that 
promotes a genuine good cannot be morally dumissed because the 
motivation is not pure. The point is that each perspective offers a 
partial truth, and both perspectives can be engaged as two poles 
of a dialectical clarification process that can be used to evaluate the 
moral dimensions of technology transfer. 
This article has examined only two ethical perspectives based, 
in part, on the work of Kohlberg (1976); there are other perspectives 
and other variations of Kant’s and Mill’s views that are not represented 
here. In addition, one must acknowledge that Kohlberg’s work has 
been criticized, and if the dialectical reasoning that we are advocating 
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is based on problematic research, one should recognize these 
difficulties and the alternatives they raise. An alternative perspective 
is offered by Gilligan (1982). She suggests that the moral development 
of women is different from that of men. In her view, Kant and Mill 
advocate an “ethic of rights,” Karit in terms of the rights and 
autonomy of moral agencies, and utilitarianism in terms of a complex 
dialectic balancing of the rights of all parties in a transfer process. 
Women, in Gilligan’s view, are more concerned with preserving 
human relationships and hence are advocates of an “ethic of care” 
or an “ethic of responsibility.” Those attached to an ethic of rights 
are concerned with the abstract rules of justice (whether Kantian 
or utilitarian), notions of social contract, and the rights of moral 
agents, whether individual or institutional (Held, 1988, p. 12). A 
feminist approach calls for a reasoning that is more narrative and 
contextual, noncontractual, and focused on others, so that caring 
relationships become the basis for ethical behavior. Gilligan’s (1987, 
p. 25) work indicates that both such methods of moral reasoning 
occur among men and women, that reasoning in the manner of an 
ethic of care occurs more frequently in women (and less frequently 
in men), and that, among men and women who are socially similar, 
there are fewer differences. What accounts for these differences is 
unclear, but Gilligan and others have argued that it is tied to differing 
ego development in men and women. For men, masculine ego 
development is based on individuation and separation from the 
mother; for women, feminine ego development is based on attachment 
(Chodorow, 1978; Gilligan, 1982). Most feminists do not wish to 
propose that a different basis for morality be constructed on these 
observations. They are only concerned that the feminist view not 
be discredited, that any male gender bias not be perpetuated in moral 
theory, that concerns traditionally characteristic of women (e.g., 
concern for children) not be dismissed from moral reflection, and 
that the feminist view be integrated into a more comprehensive moral 
theory (Held, 1988, p. 13). 
If one grants the legitimacy of this critique, does it significantly 
change the dialectical perspective proposed earlier for matters of 
technology transfer? It is not clear that the feminist perspective 
prescribes any different set of moral principles; what it may call for 
is a different approach to problems of technology transfer, a different 
weighing of factors and elements (derived from context), and a 
recognition of the legitimacy of certain topics that have been omitted 
from many discussions of ethical theory-e.g., care for each and every 
country and care for those as yet unable to frame their needs. 
If one integrates the feminist viewpoint, one must balance an 
ethic of rights with an ethic of care. In the ethic of rights, one must 
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balance competing claims and rights of stakeholders in a complex 
dialectical process, weighing contrasting factors and the competing 
claims of individuals and institutions, recognizing the factors of social 
utility and social responsibility, and respecting the autonomy of 
individuals and institutions, including organizations and countries. 
On the other side, an ethic of care underscores a common history 
and a sense of an advancing smallness of the planet. Paradoxically, 
i t  may accentuate certain features of both Kant and Mill. It extends 
the Kantian motive of good will beyond the rights and autonomy 
of individuals to care for the human family and planet as such, and 
to the unconditional acceptance of the rights of all persons and 
institutions. It also extends the utilitarian emphasis on generalized 
benevolence to a sense that the whole planet and the human family 
is a system of interconnected parts so that any exploitation of 
individuals, groups, societies, or countries will have an impact on 
the whole and return to haunt both the exploiters and the exploited. 
It does not change the nature of the problems of technology transfer 
nor the nature of principles to which one might appeal (e.g., fairness 
to all parties); i t  only changes the perspective from one of separation 
(balancing rights and principles) to one of connection and 
contextualization. An ethic of care could not be blind to specific 
individuals and context, and therefore i t  would advocate a view of 
fairness in contrast to that suggested by Rawls’s (1957) technique 
of a “veil of ignorance.” In his method, stakeholders could decide 
on the fairest allocation of resources or rights i f  each of the 
stakeholders would assume, for the duration of the decision-making 
process, that none of them could know what their post-decision status 
was to be until after the decision was reached and a course of action 
was implemented. For example, in the case of the agricultural library 
and its decision to automate, the stakeholders would assume that 
they would make choices not knowing whether, after the choice was 
made and implemented, they were the minister of agriculture from 
the developed country, the head librarian, the vendor from the 
developed country, a wealthy farmer, an illiterate farmer, a user, a 
consumer, or a staff member. In this way, Rawls thinks that 
stakeholders would be more inclined to make rulings that were fairer 
to each party since each stakeholder, under the veil of ignorance, 
would not know where he or she would be at the end of the process. 
But the feminist position would argue that the veil of ignorance 
may be itself a problem because the context cannot be ignored, and 
a genuine fairness may acknowledge differences among the specific 
stakeholders. For example, fairness may mean that one ignore the 
demands of the wealthy farmers (perhaps even penalizing those who 
previously abused the available systems) or the administrators and 
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heed more fully the demands of those who suffered more past 
inequities (illiterate farmers, those members who have the most 
barriers to technology usage). In general, feminists do not demand 
that this perspective dominate, only that this voice be respected in 
the deliberation process. 
Even if Kohlberg’s theory is incomplete and feminism adds new 
principles (and not just perspectives), one can still regard moral 
deliberation in technology transfer as enhanced through a dialectical 
process in which the coexisting poles of Kantianism, and util- 
itarianism, “masculinism” (if that is how one may characterize the 
history of philosophy, as having been dominated by male thinkers), 
and feminism are used for framing ethical issues and coming to closure 
on them. 
In conclusion, issues in technology transfer are not simple, and, 
although ethical considerations may amplify their complexity, such 
considerations are essential for evaluating the appropriateness and 
consequences of certain technologies and their transfer, since they 
can clarify issues and raise important challenges. There is an implicit 
ideology bound to the information age, an ideology that is self serving 
and full of dubious values and that may work against the quality 
of life in LDCs and on the planet. Part of this ideology is the belief 
that all problems can be solved through some form of technology, 
that technologies are morally neutral, and that technology is an 
unqualified good. One of the functions of ethics is to critique this 
prevailing ideology. Dahlgren (in Slack, 1987, p. 27) calls for a 
conscious ideology to counter this tacit yet dominant ideology. Ellul 
(1980) observes that one option is the practice of an ethic of nonpower 
as a resistance to the domination of technology in our culture. This 
option, infrequently recognized, but of ten necessary, states that 
appropriate technology may mean the absence or the minimization 
of technology, the refusal to implement technology or the 
simplification of technology, even those information technologies 
that at first blush may seem to solve a myriad of problems. Could 
it be suggested, as Dosa (1985) does, that many authors “overestimate 
the role of information technology and present it as a panacea to 
all project-related problems . . .” (p. 146) in providing technical 
assistance for development? Sometimes appropriate technology may 
mean engaging one’s own resources and simplifying and refusing 
high-tech solutions to problems. Only by doing so might we inhibit 
the spread of ill effects of technology to LDCs and preserve a viable 
planet for all countries, both developed and developing. 
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